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ABSTRACT: Historical epistemology, according to the historian of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, 
is a space through which «to take experimental laboratory work into the realm of philosophy». 
This key concept, together with the crucial events and challenges of his career, were discussed in 
a public conversation which took place on the occasion of Rheinberger’s retirement. By making 
sense of natural phenomena in the laboratory, the act of experimenting shapes the object; 
it is this shaping which became the core of Rheinberger’s own research across biology and 
philosophy into history. For his intellectual agenda, a history of the life sciences so constructed 
became «epistemologically demanding».
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A group of colleagues and friends met with Hans-Jörg Rheinberger on 
the evening of February 24th, 2011, at the Residencia de Estudiantes in 
Madrid. This discussion about his career was part of a workshop convened 
to pay tribute to Rheinberger, whose contributions had been influential in 
the career trajectories of all the attendees (*). The event was conceived as 
 (*) The meeting, part of the workshop Historical and Biological Times, was funded with the sup-
port of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (FFI2010-09866 and in part HUM2006-
04939) and the regional research network CREP (S2007/ HUM 0501). For contributions to the 
Festschrift, see the special issue of History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. 2013; 35 (1).
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a Fest on the occasion of his retirement, following more than 20 years of 
study in the history and philosophy of the life sciences. On that evening, 
an intense discussion with Rheinberger took place in the form of a round 
table, a choral interview in which the organizers and audience asked 
Rheinberger questions about his academic and intellectual background. The 
Residencia de Estudiantes kindly recorded the conversation, which we have 
transcribed, working hand with hand with Rheinberger. It is a dialogue in 
which the origins of Rheinberger’s intellectual and scientific interests are 
recounted and commented on. To provide context, some early information 
about his youth and family life has been added to the original conversation 
and interview which, overall, provides a general insight into a career that 
brought Rheinberger to the history and epistemology of biology. 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger was born in Grabs (Switzerland), grew up in 
Vaduz (Liechtenstein), and studied biology, chemistry and philosophy at 
the universities of Tübingen and Berlin. He was awarded a masters degree 
in philosophy, a PhD in Biology, was researcher at the Max Planck Institute 
of Molecular Genetics in Berlin and Professor of History of Science at the 
universities of Lübeck and Göttingen, prior to being appointed Director of the 
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. In 1997, from this 
position, he developed a networking project entitled The Cultural History of 
Heredity, which involved scholars from Europe and the Americas. Rheinberger 
has carried out and promoted research into the history and epistemology 
of experimentation, and has contributed extensively to the development of 
studies and discussions on the history and philosophy of the life sciences. 
Among his many significant publications, Toward a history of epistemic 
things, in which Rheinberger develops his biological epistemology, has been 
particularly influential 1. This epistemology had many influences, including a 
combination of the German philosophical tradition with a post-Foucauldian 
approach, and the use of historical materialism to study the history of scientific 
practice, embedded in the scientific certainties of twentieth-century biology. 
An epistemology of the concrete and, together with Staffan Müller-Wille, A 
cultural history of heredity, are Rheinberger’s most recent texts 2.
 1. Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg. Toward a history of epistemic things: Synthesizing proteins in the test 
tube. Stanford: Stanford University Press; 1997.
 2. Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg. An epistemology of the concrete: Twentieth-century histories of life. 
Durham: Duke University Press; 2010; Müller-Wille, Staffan; Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg. A cultural 
history of heredity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2012.
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As is the case with a number of contemporary historians of science and 
medicine, Rheinberger’s work as a historian and as a scientist have been 
mutually reinforcing, illustrating one of the many ways experimental practice 
can engage in a dialogue with the humanities. As a historian of the life sciences 
and as a biologist, he linked the spaces of history and biology, proposing 
a philosophical relationship between them. Rheinberger’s contributions to 
the epistemology of the life sciences through his conceptualization of the 
practices of contemporary biological research and his circulation of such 
terms as «experimental system» and «epistemic thing»  were discussed 
during this public conversation. 
María Jesús Santesmases: The first question I would like to ask is about 
your childhood and youth, to what extent did your education —your 
Bildung— contain the origins of your interests and ambitions.
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger: I grew up in a micro-country, Liechtenstein, in an 
even tinier village, Vaduz, between the Rhine valley and the Alps. My first 
language was an Alemannic dialect. I only began to learn «High German» 
in my third year of primary school. Then I attended secondary school, the 
only «Gymnasium» in the country, led by the congregation of the Marist 
Brothers, who had fled from Nazi Germany to Liechtenstein in 1936. But 
politics was not an issue in my secondary school education. What left a 
deep imprint, however, was a particularly agile and multi-talented teacher. 
He gave lessons in Latin, German literature, philosophy, drawing, painting, 
typewriting, stenography, photography and biology. He sparked my interest 
in all of that. He even gathered a few pupils around him to learn Russian. 
He used to be one or two lessons ahead of us and transmit what he himself 
had learned the day before. He was of the opinion that Russian was one of 
the world languages that an educated citizen of our time should be able to 
understand. No political connotations. Just cultural curiosity, although one 
must not forget it was at the time of the «thaw». I think I learned a lot from 
Frater Ganss, as he was called. I heard of DNA for the first time in one of 
his biology classes in the early 1960s. I think it was him who convinced 
me that studying biochemistry would be a future-oriented decision. He 
himself was a doctor in philosophy whose dissertation had been on Seneca. 
And indeed, I started out my university education in biochemistry at the 
small German university town of Tübingen. Not without continuing to take 
lessons in Russian and proudly sitting in a café trying to read a Russian 
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newspaper available at the only kiosk with international press products in 
the center of the city.
Santesmases: And your family?
Rheinberger: A stimulating atmosphere reigned at home as well. My parents 
were both practicing medical doctors; had the economic situation of the 
family been different, my father probably would have chosen to become a 
historian. When my father toured the countryside in the afternoons to visit 
patients, he took us children with him. Quite early on, however, I decided 
that I would never become a doctor. My father knew everything about the 
history of the family and the country in which I grew up, together with my 
younger brother and sister. My father’s archaeological interest had come 
down to him from his own father who had been the self-taught founder of 
local archaeology. He, my grandfather, was an artist and architect who had 
been educated at the Academy of Arts in Munich. We had a nineteenth-
century composer in our family —Josef Rheinberger, who taught and lived 
in Munich as well— who was held in high esteem by my father who loved 
music and had played the violin as a young boy. I had piano lessons early 
on, from age nine if I remember correctly. My mother was more inclined 
to literature and had a substantial library at home —literary Catholicism 
I would say. A patient of my father’s, a well-known German editor, was 
publishing a library of Russian world literature at the time— and we received 
all the volumes in the order they were published. We learned to love nature 
by spending the summer months in the mountains and touring all the 
peaks in the surrounding Alps. Science proper, however, was not an issue 
at home. And when I grew older I became quite annoyed by the weight of 
the traditional values that reigned supreme in the family.
Matiana González-Silva: Can you explain your personal career, and even 
more than explaining your trajectory, explain how these different areas of 
expertise —biology, history and philosophy— have mutually influenced 
each other in your intellectual trajectory? 
Rheinberger: It might not be easy to explain this briefly, but I will try to 
be as brief as I can. I started out my academic life after secondary school at 
the University of Tübingen, in Germany, which at that time, in the middle 
of the 1960s, was still not part of the big world, but a small provincial place 
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to be: a very traditional German university town in which, interestingly 
enough, there had existed a number of Max Planck Institutes since the end 
of the Second World War. It was also the first university in Germany where 
one could study biochemistry with a diploma, a hybrid science between 
biology and chemistry that in the rest of Germany did not yet exist as an 
academically qualified discipline in its own right during the 1960s. I was 
fascinated by the perspective of being a student of a specialty that was really 
new and could only be studied here. That is how I started out. 
After a year or so, however, I realized that this would not be a job for 
the rest of my life. I was disappointed by all the preliminary courses and 
exams one had to do there: taking a course in botany, taking a course in 
zoology, in anatomy, in mathematics, doing everything else but biochemistry. 
There was simply no biochemistry in this first year. And nobody explained 
why one had to do all this. I got the impression that probably I had chosen 
the wrong thing, and that I should try something else.
I abruptly shifted gears after a year and switched to philosophy, from 
a small scientific specialty to the queen discipline of the humanities. 
Tübingen was actually a good place to study philosophy at that time as 
a number of both nationally and internationally very well-known figures 
were there, among them Ernst Bloch and Walter Schulz. That switch found 
its continuation when I went from Tübingen to Berlin after another year 
in the province. In those times, if you wanted to graduate in a discipline 
like philosophy you would have to choose one or two additional minor 
subjects as your second and third specialties. It so happened that at that 
time in Berlin there was again something very new to be studied that did 
not exist in the rest of Germany: the Technical University had a chair for 
general linguistics in its Humanities Department. That meant one could 
study aspects of languages without connection to a particular language such 
as German or French. I was fascinated with this option, and it became my 
first minor. I should probably add at this point that language, writing poems 
included, had fascinated me since my adolescence. After having completed 
my master’s thesis in philosophy in 1972, my aborted attempts to study 
biochemistry made themselves felt again. In addition, I had moved, with 
my thesis, to philosophy of science. So I thought it might be a good thing 
to somehow finish studying the science I had started out with. These were 
among the reasons why I turned back to the sciences. And since one could 
not study biochemistry proper in West Berlin at the Free University, I took 
biology and chemistry in parallel. It is a somewhat convoluted background, 
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but that is how I came to have one foot in the humanities and the other 
in the sciences. 
González-Silva: Science as the subject of reflection in your philosophical 
and historical work is clearly informed by your activity as a scientist. 
But what about the other way round? How did your epistemological and 
historical works and thoughts affect your practice in the laboratory? How 
do you feel they might have had an influence?
Rheinberger: Actually, when I returned to biology and chemistry and 
started all over again to basically undergo a second academic education, I 
was very much permeated by my socialization in philosophy, and my idea 
was to go through that process as soon as possible and then get back to 
philosophy of science. But then things started to develop in a different way. 
When I had to do my diploma thesis in biology, I was lucky enough to get 
a place as a diploma student at one of the Max Planck Institutes in Berlin, 
the Max Planck Institute for Molecular Genetics, a job I almost failed to 
get because when I came to the interview I was naïve enough to tell the 
supervisor that I would like to do my diploma thesis and then quickly go 
back to philosophy. He was not very delighted by the prospect of having a 
diploma student who was only interested in working for a year and then, 
when he had learned the techniques in order to really tackle a serious 
problem, would disappear again. Nevertheless, he found it interesting enough 
that such a strange guy came and said «Actually I want to do philosophy 
but I need to finish my biology», that he told me to come back in a couple 
of months if I was still interested. I was finally accepted in the laboratory 
and after a year the problem was solved for me anyway: I had become so 
fascinated with laboratory work that I had forgotten my philosophical 
ambitions for the time being. So I simply went on with my experimental 
work, ending up with a PhD, and as was still the habit for academics in 
those days in Germany, my habilitation. 
But coming back to your question: it was not easy for me to learn the 
lesson that all the beautiful philosophy of science I had read in books did 
not help me to do good experiments. I was rather confronted with having to 
forget this kind of training in thinking about generalities and musing about 
concepts. I was becoming immersed in a work that was much more bound 
to technical handling, to feeling one’s way through in experimentation, and 
getting the questions back from the material one was working with, rather 
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than coming with a very important problem and then trying to solve it in 
the laboratory. My experience was that it worked the other way around: 
the questions arise from the laboratory bench, and they have to be solved 
in one way or the other by the means at hand. So if you are working in a 
laboratory that has no electron microscope, for example, you cannot use 
electron microscopy to solve your problem. You have to work with the 
technologies that are around, unless you are lucky to have the opportunity 
of becoming acquainted with another technology by getting a month or 
two off, and going into another laboratory in order to learn a technique 
that helps you solve your problem. But it is a very different way of going 
about questions if one is working as an experimental scientist. So I probably 
should briefly answer the question as follows: what I had to do at first was 
to forget about philosophy in order to become a working scientist.
Miguel García-Sancho: A specific space in which you sought to integrate 
the practice of biology with the epistemological study of this discipline as a 
historian of biology was the laboratory of Paul Zamecnik at the Massachusetts 
General Hospital in Boston. This was the laboratory in which transfer RNA 
was discovered and where an influential test tube system for synthesizing 
proteins was designed. This laboratory has been the main object of your 
book Toward a history of epistemic things, a book which has inspired a 
generation of historians and philosophers of biology. What led you to 
address this laboratory historically and to study the history of the events 
that took place in this particular setting?
Rheinberger: I must quickly come back to the former question and 
complete my reply, because otherwise I cannot answer this one. I did not 
forget about philosophy during the time I was in the laboratory. What I 
meant was that what I had learned in philosophy did not help me very 
much to do good experiments. But thinking in terms of philosophy had 
been a kind of experience that on the other hand I did not want to quit 
altogether. So in parallel and in my free time over the weekends, I continued 
to cultivate my interest in questions of philosophy. I even taught a little 
philosophy of science to science students, and gradually, over time, more 
history of science. I had come to the conclusion that if there was a lesson 
to be learned from doing experimental laboratory work and taking that 
over into the realm of philosophy, making it work in the humanities, what 
we needed to have was subject matter, things to work on. And it appeared 
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to me that a good way to work this through for a philosopher of science 
would be to turn oneself to historical questions. And so I started to see 
whether in one way or the other, I could make sense of the theoretical 
ideas of what science was by looking into the history of the sciences. This 
became my secondary occupation during all the time I was working in the 
laboratory: my spare time was devoted to what I today would call historical 
epistemology. At a certain point I had to make up my mind whether the 
second half of my academic career should be in molecular biology or in 
this historically-modified field of my early philosophical interest. After a 
long hesitation I came to the conclusion that I wanted to do the second, 
leaving the laboratory and really becoming a full-time, epistemologically-
motivated historian of science.
Now to your question. The reason why I chose Paul Zamecnik’s 
Laboratory is, speaking frankly, this: I went back in time about 10 years 
in the field in which I myself had been working as a molecular biologist 
and started to study the «prehistory» of the experiments I had carried out 
when working in the laboratory. For me that proved to be a very fruitful 
and rewarding exercise because in that way I could carry over a little bit 
of the experiences I had had when working as a scientist into my activity 
as a historian of science. I could read all these papers starting from the 
early 1940s into the 1960s with the eyes of my own experience, and this 
turned out to be very productive. And it was a productive period of the 
laboratory of Paul Zamecnik at the Massachusetts General Hospital in 
Boston. What I saw there was rather familiar to me and I realized that, as 
opposed to somebody whose training is in history of science alone, I could 
also read between the lines and practice another reading of a scientific text, 
differently from somebody who did not have that experimental experience. 
So working with that historical material turned out to be very rewarding. 
Here I came to see that the experimental work I had done in the laboratory 
had been fruitful for my work in the history of science. Alas, not the other 
way around, as I have told you. And strangely enough, doing history helped 
me to understand better my own former laboratory practice, and it was also 
here that my former exercises in philosophy, above all French philosophy, 
suddenly acquired a new dimension and a new meaning.
García-Sancho: The biological laboratory and the epistemological study of 
biology are, to some extent, spaces of negotiation between the practicing 
biologist and the historian and philosopher of biology. What were the 
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main challenges you faced when studying this concrete space of biological 
practice at Paul Zamecnik’s Laboratory?
Rheinberger: There were quite a number of challenges that came up. 
Maybe the major challenge for me was very personal. I had been working 
for roughly 15 years in the laboratory as a molecular biologist, as a bench 
worker doing my experiments every day. After having decided to go into 
the history of science, I also had to switch communities. I had learned to 
negotiate with scientists in their conferences, smaller conferences or larger 
congresses. I had learned to talk about what I was doing and I had become 
familiar with the community. Now, I had to leave it and become acquainted 
with another, quite different community, that of historians of science and 
philosophers of science. I chose Paul Zamecnik’s laboratory as my object 
of historical work for reasons explained above. It was an enquiry into the 
pre-history of my own laboratory work. At the same time, I was trying to 
catch up with my own philosophical past and see whether I could find 
alternative categories that would help me to make sense of laboratory work 
more generally, but in a rather idiosyncratic way.
The main problem at the beginning was that when I was starting to talk 
to the history and philosophy of science community, I had to make myself 
understandable. My new colleagues were not used to the strange mix of a 
very narrow focus on laboratory work on the one hand, and on the other 
hand categories and concepts from French philosophy that were more or 
less foreign to historians and philosophers of science — dominated as the 
field was by the Anglo-Saxon tradition. It was an interesting experience; 
I would not have wanted to miss it. The questions I received were always 
introduced by caveats such as «If I understand you correctly» or «I am not 
sure if I understand you correctly». [laughs]
González-Silva: If I understand you correctly, I would say that historical 
epistemology and the philosophy of experimental practices became one 
of the leitmotifs in the work that followed your experimental life and the 
questions that you posed —from a philosophical point of view— about 
what it means to do experiments. So for people who are not familiar with 
this very influential term, I wonder whether you can explain your vision 
of historicizing epistemology. 
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Rheinberger: It is difficult. But probably one can. To explain how I came 
to my position necessarily means to get personal. I experienced laboratory 
work as a big challenge. It is hard work. Ninety per cent of what one is 
trying does not lead to anything. In order to survive as a respected scientist, 
you have to devote all your time to the endeavour. It is a challenge, and 
it is something that can go wrong. In a way, I wanted to take this kind of 
challenge over to my new field, and work on something that would take 
all my time there as well. 
When I was joining the history of science community, a movement 
had just started that turned out to be very consequential for the history of 
science. History of science as a history of ideas was starting to be replaced 
by a focus on the social, and in particular also the material context in which 
science is practiced. You can do that of course without much sophistication, 
but you can also try to do it with theoretical sophistication, and that is what 
I wanted to do: to bring a little epistemic challenge to this new practice. 
One of the key concepts that became rather important for me was the 
concept of «epistemic object» or «epistemic thing». It is part of that effort 
because it postulates that in order to understand how the sciences, at least 
the experimental sciences, develop over the course of time (I would not say 
in every instance, but in the long run) one must understand how natural 
phenomena are being shaped in the laboratory in a way so that one can, with 
the means at hand, make sense of them. That means that shaping scientific 
objects is a necessary premise for their conceptualization. So concepts do 
not come alone in the natural sciences: they compact and correlate with 
this continuous effort of shaping phenomena that we do not encounter in 
our world in this pure form. Doing experimental science is thus a shaping 
process, and not just a passive observational business. And I would say that 
is even true for astronomy: we cannot touch the moon or the sun, but we 
are nevertheless materially interacting with their emanations when we are 
doing astronomical work.
González-Silva: Alongside your theoretically demanding work as a 
philosopher and historian, and your experimental work, you also translated, 
among others, Jacques Derrida into German. In fact, you were working 
in an intellectual ambiance strongly influenced by historical materialism, 
which highlights the importance of historical change, historicizing received 
categories and focusing on the material aspects of reality. My question is 
what role you think this theoretical framework had for your scholarly efforts.
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Figure 1.—Hans-Jörg Rheinberger between Miguel García-Sancho and Matiana González-Silva at 
the Residencia de Estudiantes, Madrid, on February 24, 2011. © Residencia de Estudiantes, Madrid
Rheinberger: I started to study in 1966. These were rather turbulent 
times for students. It was also the high point of a rediscovery of Marxist 
literature —above all the writings of Marx himself— that had been buried 
under world wars and cold wars; it was an important ingredient of my 
early student days. The general gist of that literature was that if you want 
to understand historical processes, you have to look not so much at what 
people are saying, but what people are doing, how they have been and are 
acting and living.
The discussion at that time in Germany, in the middle and toward the 
end of the 1960s, was relatively underdeveloped in comparison to the debates 
that were going on for instance in France, but also in Italy, where taking up 
Marxist themes could be much more freely practiced as there were strong 
communist parties in these countries and there were precedents for such 
discussions. That tradition was practically non-existent in post-war Germany 
and we had the feeling at that time as students that something important 
was going on in Europe —and the world at large— that we should not miss. 
Particularly important to me were the French philosophical discussions of 
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the 1960s. French had been my first foreign language at school and during 
my early years as a student I frequently spent summers in Paris.
Out of these interests and contacts grew my decision to translate one of 
the books that I read at that time, which happened to be De la grammatologie 
by Jacques Derrida 3. Derrida usually is not narrowly associated with leftist 
positions, but you only have to look at the interviews that Derrida gave 
later in the 1980s and early 1990s to see how he himself was shaped by that 
discussion. His decision to start out with a very thorough analysis of the 
writings of the late Edmund Husserl are part of this whole context, as an 
attempt at an alternative materialist phenomenology that could lay claims 
to be based on the writings of Husserl himself, the father of phenomenology. 
There was also a more trivial aspect to that work. Translating at that time 
was a way for us students to make our living, so we could get a little money 
from it and survive economically on our own feet, and the work one was 
doing was nevertheless related to the studies one was pursuing. It was 
bringing things together at the theoretical level but also at the material 
and economic level. I do not know how that is in Spain today, but the 
opportunities to make one’s living as a student, it appears to me, have 
considerably changed over the forty or fifty years since.
García-Sancho: The approach of theorizing from the historical transformation 
of very basic material practices and categories of science has been a main 
avenue of your research program at the Max Planck Institute for the History 
of Science in Berlin. Could the scientific program of your department at the 
Max Planck Institute be considered as an institutional embodiment of this 
attempt to integrate the theory and the practice of biology in a historical 
and philosophical agenda?
Rheinberger: That is complicated to answer. It is still the case in the Max 
Planck Society that if a director of a Department in one of its Institutes is 
appointed, then he or she is expected to decide about the program of the 
Department according to his or her interests, and nobody else will decide 
on what is being done there. The director however has the responsibility 
to explain these interests to an international committee every two years 
 3. Derrida, Jacques. De la grammatologie. Paris: Editions de Minuit; 1967. German translation by 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Hans Zischler. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992. See also Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger. Traslating Derride. Dalhousie French Studies. 2008; 82:85-91. 
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and demonstrate that what the group is doing is meeting the standards of 
what is internationally considered to be of excellent quality, but that is the 
only requirement. What I tried to do during my time at the Max Planck 
Institute was to remain faithful to the program I had shaped for myself in 
the years before. But this is only one aspect. The other is that I also wanted 
to provide a space where people who came with different ideas could 
also develop their own programs and participate in this basic freedom. If 
there was one thing that remained constant over time, it was the constant 
challenge of writing a history of science that is epistemically demanding; not 
teaching how to do it, but keeping it as a constant challenge. This means 
that if you want to become a historian of science, you should not just go 
to the archives and dig out documents. That is also important, and it is 
part of the job of the historian of science to recruit new resources that so 
far have not been looked at, but not for their own sake. Take the good old 
notion of case study seriously, which means that a case study has to tell 
you something that points to and goes beyond the case you are working on. 
That is exactly what I was trying to do with the book you have been 
mentioning, the case study on the laboratory of Paul Zamecnik. I did that 
study not because it was Zamecnik, and not because I was particularly 
interested in that group. It was because I had the impression that I could 
make an argument on the basis of their work, on the example of this very 
concrete material, that points beyond itself and that gives incentives to 
engage in a discussion —hopefully an ongoing discussion. As far as I can 
see it, exactly this is happening at our workshop.
Santesmases: Another question remains to be posed, about the origins of 
your research program at the Max Planck Institute on the cultural history 
of heredity. Was it, at least in part, a consequence of contemporary culture’s 
intense focus on genetics as well as the intellectual challenge of bringing 
the term «heredity» back into the historical and philosophical realm?
Rheinberger: The project on the Cultural history of heredity has several 
roots. My own interest in the history of heredity goes back to common 
work with my colleague Peter McLaughlin in the late 1970s and the 1980s. 
The phenomenon of Gregor Mendel had occupied us, as it probably has 
every historian of biology once in his or her life, and at the same time it 
became clear to us that on the basis of our limited investigation, we were far 
from being able to solve the puzzle. The chance for a more encompassing 
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investigation was only opened when I joined the Max Planck Institute. 
There I participated, in the middle of the 1990s, in a collective effort to 
write a critical history of the gene concept organized by Raphael Falk and 
Peter Beurton 4. I tried to deal with the gene as an embodied concept whose 
changes are best understood as a result of the change of the experimental 
practices in which it became embedded in the course of the twentieth century. 
I was deeply unsatisfied with many philosophers’ attempts to try to define 
exactly what a gene is. I came to the conclusion that a certain imprecision 
in the definition of scientific concepts, rather than being deleterious, can 
be a driving force in the research process. At the same time, I was intrigued 
by the discrepancy between the reification of what genes are in public 
discourse and their fluidity at the research front.
Later, at the beginning of the 2000s, Staffan Müller-Wille and I took up 
the challenge to extend this endeavour in the direction of a cultural history 
of heredity. An additional incentive came from a historiographical debate 
rising as a consequence of the «practical turn» in the history of science with 
its concomitant preference for short-range case studies. We know these 
kinds of titles (freely invented): «A history of paper chromatography in 
Finland 1943-1952», «Solving the puzzle of peptide bond formation at the 
Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, 1951 to 1956», and the like. But 
what about a longue-durée history of heredity —if not of the life sciences 
as a whole— from the early modern period to the present? One knew 
these kinds of histories, based on an overarching history of ideas approach. 
However, could there be such a long-term history and could one remain 
faithful at the same time to some kind of practice perspective? Undertaking 
these challenges was a historical and a historiographical adventure.
It was, above all, a great experience in community building that will 
hopefully last for some time to come. The project rested in its essence 
on the cooperation of an international and an interdisciplinary group of 
scholars, and it took the form of a series of workshops extending over a 
period of about a decade. These workshops served as an opportunity to 
meet regularly for all those interested in the history of heredity around the 
world. Over the course of the years, the workshops moved more or less 
chronologically from the early modern period to the present. A number of 
 4. Beurton, Peter; Falk, Raphael; Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg, eds. The concept of the gene in development 
and evolution: Historical and epistemological perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; 2000.
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colleagues accompanied us all along the way; others shared their specific 
expertise with us more sporadically. Without this background, Staffan and 
I would never have been able to write our A Cultural History of Heredity 5. 
And respectively, I hope that everyone participating in this collective 
endeavor also profited from it in one way or the other.
From the audience, Emilio Muñoz: You have seen that scientists and 
philosophers, or historians of science are trying to break boundaries between 
them to some extent, but at the same time you have been working just at 
these boundaries. In connection with the two scientific communities, the 
philosophers/historians and the molecular biologists, how do you judge 
your relationship with them and how do you think these communities have 
maintained their relationship with you? 
Rheinberger: This is a very interesting and also a very important question. 
But I would like to make it a little bit more complicated, and not make it 
only a question about the community of the scientists on one hand, and 
on the other the communities of the human scientists, or humanists. My 
experience has been, and still is, that the boundaries between historians of 
science and philosophers of science erected over a century are as difficult 
to cross as the boundaries between working scientists and historians of 
science or philosophers of science. If you look into the physical sciences, 
I guess that crossing the boundaries between theoretical physicists and 
philosophers of science, for instance, is much easier. If it comes to a field 
like biology, crossing boundaries between biologists and historians of 
biology is easier to manage than with philosophers of science. In any case 
it is fruitful to try it. I would even claim that today it is very important that 
our academic structures encourage such interactions, not in the spirit of a 
shallow idea of interdisciplinarity, but to create and keep open spaces for 
people who have been socialized into different specialties within biology 
(the boundaries of which can be as difficult to cross as, for instance, the 
boundaries between biology and physics). 
 5. Müller-Wille; Rheinberger, n. 2. See also Müller-Wille, Staffan; Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, eds. Hered-
ity produced: At the crossroads of biology, politics, and culture, 1500-1870. Cambridge: MIT 
Press; 2007. Project’s website with links to pre-print publications: http://www.mpiwg-berlin.
mpg.de/en/research/projects/DeptIII_Cultural_History_Heredity (last accessed April 2013).
Miguel García-Sancho; Matiana González-Silva and María Jesús Santesmases 
Dynamis 2014; 34 (1): 193-209
208
It is important not only to have the opportunity to talk to each other, 
but to be forced to talk to each other. Even if it is difficult to understand 
each other, something will remain. The important thing is the impulse one 
gets for reflection beyond what one is actually doing, and what usually 
absorbs oneself. I think this is a constant challenge, and even for fields 
like the history of science and philosophy of science, if I look back over 20 
years, there have been disappointments in this respect. 
When I joined the field towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning 
of the 1990s, there were many places around the globe where historians 
and philosophers of science were trying to join forces. Many of these places 
fell apart again towards the end of the millennium, and the interactions 
no longer exist the way they did before. It is not something that is given 
once forever; it is a constant challenge, a permanent boundary work, and 
I think we are obliged to do that as good citizens of our smaller or larger 
academic villages.
From the audience, Richard Burian: It seems to me that the opportunities 
for confrontation have changed rather dramatically among the life scientists, 
that the current situation with interdisciplinary teams is that they rather 
frequently find themselves calling for outside help with talking to each 
other, and that is a more important role because they are demanding help 
from philosophers and historians to enter into their discussions. Do you 
see this as something that has changed since the time you were in the 
laboratory yourself, and if so, what are the opportunities, or do you see it 
rather differently than I do?
Rheinberger: This is a question that is not easy to answer, and probably 
the situation within the sciences, in particular the life sciences, has been 
changing dramatically. I still remember that when I came into the laboratory, 
at the end of the 1970s, it was very difficult to survive as somebody who 
had the ambition to be a theoretical biologist; that sort of thing was not 
held in very high esteem. There was one journal, Theoretical Biology —still 
in its early years, I think— but if you were trained as a biologist, this was 
not a popular field. You had to work at the bench and do your empirical 
work before you could possibly move to theory. Now, within the life 
sciences themselves, things have been changing. There is talk about systems 
biology and similar things, and the need for synthetic views has become 
much stronger because the data that are being created on a grand scale are 
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becoming so overwhelming that new skills are needed. On one hand, they 
come from the development of areas like bioinformatics, but also from areas 
that in earlier times were connected to philosophy. I know, for instance, of a 
very renowned analytical philosopher who for quite a number of years was 
hired by people working in the life sciences who were feeling that in order 
to deal with the massive data coming from genome sequencing projects, 
they needed basic categorical and conceptual structures in place in order to 
relate to and deal with them in a fruitful fashion. People call it the creation 
of ontologies, and philosophers come into this business and they can have 
an important say in developing such new conceptual structures. 
So there are many interactions between different scientific fields. 
The problematic thing is that we are habitually caught by these kinds 
of disciplinary structures that to a certain extent are still shaping our 
universities and make the impression that they were and would remain 
there forever. But the sciences are actually very much like living bodies that 
constantly change, and with that change the options and the possibilities 
of interaction. It is first and foremost the movement, the dynamics of the 
sciences themselves that create new possibilities for interaction. One has 
to seize upon them in one way or another. And I think there are also today 
other and different options for creating new interactions between the life 
and the social sciences, more than forty or fifty years ago.
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